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EDUCATING THE ACTIVE ARMY OFFICER
ON THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

BY

Lieutenant Colonel Jack R. Fox
United States Army National Guard

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
USAWC CLASS OF 1992

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92-14463



UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army War College		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Root Hall, Building 122 Carlisle, PA 17013-5050			9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)	
15. PAGE COUNT					
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP			
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, has called for a "Total Army," built upon trust and respect. A key factor associated with achieving this desired goal is the knowledge and understanding an Active Army officer possesses about the Army National Guard. This study examines the background of the Guard, what is taught about the Guard in the Army school system, and what can be done to improve the education process. This study is built upon research, interviews, and a detailed analysis of survey data provided by 142 Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve members of the U.S. Army War College Class of 1992. Recommendations include adding classes on the National Guard to the curriculum at Army schools, improving the opportunities for "hands on" experience, and the development of a means of self-study on the Army National Guard.					
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL RALPH E. KAHLAN, COL, IN			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (717) 245-3510		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL AWCAE

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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EDUCATING THE ACTIVE ARMY OFFICER
ON THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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United States Army National Guard

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013



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Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
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Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Jack R. Fox, LTC, ARNG

TITLE: Educating the Active Army Officer on the Army National Guard

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 21 January 1992 **PAGES:** 50 **CLASSIFICATION:** Unclassified

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, has called for a "Total Army," built upon trust and respect. A key factor associated with achieving this desired goal is the knowledge and understanding an Active Army officer possesses about the Army National Guard. This study examines the background of the Guard, what is taught about the Guard in the Army school system, and what can be done to improve the education process. This study is built upon research, interviews, and a detailed analysis of survey data provided by 142 Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve members of the U.S. Army War College Class of 1992. Recommendations include adding classes on the National Guard to the curriculum at Army schools, improving the opportunities for "hands on" experience, and the development of a means of self-study on the Army National Guard.

INTRODUCTION

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, addressed the 113th General Conference of the National Guard Association in Honolulu, Hawaii, on 4 September 1991. During his address, he stated his commitment to the One Army, "Total Army," concept. He emphasized that the Army of the future will be smaller and the Army National Guard will be a key part of the Army Team. General Sullivan further stated:

First we must promote mutual understanding among the components of the Total Army.

Second, we will strive to improve the integration of active reserve forces by focusing on those systems that inhibit our working together--in particular, the personnel, pay, maintenance and supply systems. . . . What I am saying can be summed up very simply--we must develop mutual trust and respect within the Total Army. That is the bottom line.¹

To insure that mutual understanding exists within the Total Army, each component must have a meaningful, working knowledge of each other. If we fail to obtain this knowledge, then we risk becoming frustrated with each other. This frustration can damage our ability to work effectively together in the "Total Army." National strategy can even be affected if the Army, Guard, and Reserve do not communicate and understand each other. The starting point for this understanding is the Army school system.

This study will determine where the Active Army is now with regard to educating its Officer Corps about the Army National Guard (ARNG). Each level of officer education, Basic, Advanced, Combined Arms Services Staff School, Command and General Staff

College, and the Army War College, is examined to determine what is taught about the National Guard.

Current officer knowledge and perceptions of the ARNG are also reviewed. This was accomplished by surveying both Reserve and Active Army members of the Army War College Class of 1992. The survey examined their current knowledge of the ARNG and their thoughts on the need for education on the ARNG. Experience levels in dealing with the ARNG are also included.

From this information, this study will look at where the Army stands with regard to achieving the Army Chief of Staff's goal of a better understanding between the Active Component and the Army National Guard. Finally, recommendations will be proposed as to how the Army might do a better job of reaching this goal.

HISTORY OF THE GUARD

The Army National Guard has been an important part of the military structure of the United States of America since long before there was a United States. The ARNG existed as early as 1636 when militia joined with the British to fight Indians and protect their homes. These citizen soldiers were the first to rally to arms and fight for independence from Great Britain during the Revolutionary War.²

Every conflict from the Revolution to the Spanish American War saw the militia leaving their jobs and families and carrying the war to the enemy. The militia actually predated the Regular Army during the American Revolution. During the American Civil

War, the overwhelming majority of soldiers were not regulars but, rather, volunteers and members of militia units. During the Spanish American War, the vast majority of soldiers were members of the common militia, which most states referred to as "the National Guard."³

In the early 1900's, the Regular Army attempted to expand. This attempt was, in a large part, a result of a desire to not rely on the National Guard in time of war. The National Defense Act of 1916 changed this attempt by the Army by officially recognizing the National Guard as an entity and making it part of the Active Army when ordered to federal service. The Guard would remain a state force during peacetime, but would receive federal assistance and be expected to attain federal standards and would be utilized when they reached those standards.⁴

At the start of World War I, the Army National Guard had twelve divisions and was called upon to organize six more. Eleven of those divisions deployed to France and made up almost half of the U.S. strength. The Germans felt that six of the National Guard divisions were excellent or superior.⁵

When World War II erupted, the National Guard mobilized and equipped eighteen divisions. The Guard proved to be a positive factor in World War II.⁶ After World War II, the Guard grew to twenty-seven divisions. The outbreak of the Korean War caused four of these divisions being federalized.⁷

The 1960's saw the ARNG being reduced in size to eight divisions and separate brigades. This occurred as the American involvement in the Vietnam War began to expand. President

Lyndon Johnson made the decision not to call for a full mobilization of the Reserve Components during this conflict. He felt a full mobilization might jeopardize his social programs.⁸ He did permit a limited mobilization following the Pueblo incident in 1968. This decision not to conduct a general mobilization of the Guard and Reserves not only deprived the country of valuable military experience, but contributed to the erosion in national commitment and will.

In 1973, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, with the concurrence of Chief of Staff of the Army, General Creighton Abrams, enacted the Total Force Policy. Its purpose was to unite the Active Army, Reserve, and Army National Guard into one "Total Army." The policy's success was clearly demonstrated during the Gulf War, which saw Congress federalize 398 ARNG units and 62,411 soldiers for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. These Guardsmen and women came from 48 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, and Puerto Rico. Two hundred ninety-seven units and 37,848 personnel were validated and deployed to Southwest Asia, 16 units and 3,378 personnel to Europe, and 57 units and 5,993 personnel remained in CONUS.⁹

The results of DESERT SHIELD/STORM have proven that the ARNG and Reserves can be relied on during war. The current draw-down of the Army will require an even greater reliance upon the ARNG in future wars. To insure that our Total Force is ready for the future, all components must know and understand one another.

INSTRUCTION ON THE ARNG IN ARMY SCHOOL SYSTEM

A key ingredient in understanding is knowledge. To gain knowledge, one must receive education. Schooling is a valuable part of that education. Within the Army, officers receive formal education through pre-commissioning programs, Officer Basic Courses, Advanced Courses, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College.

An examination of Reserve Component instructional material, particularly on the National Guard, revealed a lack of emphasis in this area. Considering that since 1970, Reserve Components have and continue to represent approximately 50 percent of the total Army force structure, this lack of emphasis is a problem. As the Army down-sizes to a twenty division force, eight divisions of which will be Guard divisions, the Active Army must take positive measures to fully understand this large portion of the Total Force.

At the present time, there exists a one-hour block of instruction on the National Guard in the Military Qualification Standards 1 Manual of Common Task. These are the pre-commissioning requirements taught in ROTC, OCS, and the U.S. Military Academy. This instruction gives a broad historical overview of the Guard, including its roots and the constitutional and legislative background which governs it.¹⁰

This instruction is of considerable importance, especially in today's Army in which fewer graduates of ROTC will be going

into the Active Army. Those being commissioned into the Active force must have a working knowledge of the ARNG. This basic instruction should provide this needed information.

The problem is there is no guaranteed follow-up to reinforce the previously-learned material. The U.S. Army Research Institute study on skill decay of the Individual Ready Reserve found that soft skills decayed mostly within six months after separation.¹¹ The knowledge of the Guard taught during MQS 1 is a soft skill, and will decay in about six months if not reinforced.

The Officer Basic Course contains no instruction on the ARNG. This course follows pre-commissioning instruction, and is given to newly commissioned officers. The Basic Course should reinforce the MQS 1 instruction. The same instructional deficiency is also present in the Officer Advanced Course.¹²

Lack of instruction on the Guard in both the Officer Basic and Advanced Courses presents a real dilemma. While TRADOC admits that instruction on the Guard might be warranted in both, the bottom line is that the "plate is full." Something would have to be dropped before anything else could be added.¹³

A review of the Program of Instruction (POI) for both the Air Defense Officer Basic and Advanced Courses revealed there is no instruction presented on the National Guard. The Air Defense Artillery has three National Guard Air Defense Brigade Headquarters, eight Chaparral battalions, four MANPADs BNs, four Hawk battalions, and one Vulcan battalion. These National Guard units make up a significant portion of the total Army Air

Defense units; and, yet, no instruction is presented to young Air Defense lieutenants and captains on the Guard. The intent is not to state there is a problem with the Air Defense Artillery School; but, rather, to illustrate a problem that is Army wide at a time when the Chief of Staff has called for greater understanding of the Reserve Components.

Following the Advanced Course, the next opportunity an Active Army officer has to receive formal instruction on the ARNG would be at the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³). This course has a correspondence phase and a follow-on resident phase at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The correspondence phase of CAS³ contains a seven hour block of instruction that describes the composition and missions of the Reserve Components; the relationship of the Army with both the ARNG and Army Reserve, and how they are mobilized.¹⁴

During the resident phase of CAS³, all students receive a course on mobilization. The course reviews the mobilization of a National Guard Unit and subsequent planning involved with bringing this unit onto active duty. This exercise examines the measures of readiness as they apply to the unit and ways to improve that readiness.¹⁵

The next important step in the officer's professional development is Command and General Staff College (CGSC). This schooling is designed to prepare officers for duty as field grade commanders and as principal staff officers at division and higher echelons.¹⁶

Under the Military History section of training, there is a one-hour class on the history of the Army National Guard. This course reviews the history of the Guard, significant legislation affecting the Guard, and the changing roll of the Guard in national defense.¹⁷

The CGSC uses small group instruction techniques. Each group normally has a Reserve Component officer student who is expected to help educate the group on the Reserves. There are four groups in each staff group, and one of these groups has to perform an Annual Training Brief for a Reserve Component unit. This is considered a hands-on approach to training and the Reserve Component officer is an important part.¹⁸

In addition to the main core of instruction, the CGSC offers a Reserve Component elective. This course is designed to prepare Active Component students for Reserve Component assignments. It addresses, in detail, the history, missions, and organization of the Guard and its relationship to the Army. It also focuses on the management systems of the Guard.¹⁹ This class normally averages only about twenty U.S. Active Army officers and a few foreign students. Normally, only those students scheduled for duty with the Reserve Components take this course of instruction.²⁰

Following attendance at CGSC, the Army officer may or may not attend another service school. If selected for battalion command, the officer will attend the Pre Command Course (PCC) at Fort Leavenworth.

Reserve Component instruction is missing in PCC.²¹ This is a serious omission since nearly every Active Army battalion commander will eventually support or evaluate an ARNG or Army Reserve unit. This support may range from loaning equipment to Reserve Component units or to conducting annual training evaluations. Yet no instruction is provided to these future battalion commanders that gives them an understanding of the unique environment of the Guard or Reserve, much less to prepare them for their valuable role of evaluating and supporting the Reserve Components.

The final formal school in the Active officer's career is the Army War College or its equivalent. The curriculum at the Army War College consists of six core courses that all students must take. These courses are structured to build on each other. While each class offers opportunities to discuss the National Guard as it relates to issues being studied, only one course has actual instruction included. This course, Implementing National Strategy, allows the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and Chief of Army Reserve to each make one-hour presentations to the class. These presentations are technically part of the Commandant's Lecture Series, however, they are scheduled to reinforce instruction received during the National Military Strategy phase of instruction.²²

Course 3, National Military Requirements and Capabilities, does present readings on the Reserve Components. These are found in the Army Command and Management, Theory and Practice Text. Additionally in Course 3, there is a national

mobilization exercise that requires participation by all students. The emphasis in this part of Course 3 lies in the overall approach to national requirements and is not structured to present a better understanding of the Guard and the unique problems faced by its members.

The U.S. Army War College does have an elective course which is offered to resident students. The stated purpose of this course is to provide a greater understanding of the Reserve Components. It also examines current issues confronting the Reserve Components.²³ This elective presents instruction that would be valuable to all Active Component officers, yet is targeted only at those officers who will be assigned to Reserve Component related duties.

There are ten Army Guard and ten Army Reserve officers in each resident U.S. Army War College class. A Reserve Component officer is assigned to each seminar. This officer is expected to represent the Reserve Component expertise in seminar discussions as appropriate. This individual provides an important part of the education process at the War College. Similar expectations are made of Sea Service and Air Force students. The potential problem, however, is that the Guard or Reserve officer will, in all probability, only have knowledge of his or her specific component. Based upon that officer's background and personal bias, the discussion or representation of Guard or Reserve issues could, in all probability, be limited.

Army Reserve and National Guard officers often have limited knowledge of the other's component. The possibility also exists that the Guard student may have limited knowledge of the Guard as a whole. The Active Army does not expect an infantry officer to have an extensive, detailed knowledge of Finance or Chemical Corps duties; likewise, a Guard officer should not be expected to be an expert on National Guard Bureau or the different State Missions.

The preceding discussion has demonstrated that there is limited instruction on the National Guard in the Army school system. At best, the current system is a "hit or miss" proposition that relies heavily upon the individual officer's personal background and assignment experience to gain a true education on the National Guard. While this may have proven to be an acceptable position up to now, it can no longer be the case.

KNOWLEDGE AND PERCEPTIONS

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Army has placed little emphasis on educating the officer corps on the National Guard. As the Army draws down, it must be assumed that more and more Active Army officers will come in contact and be expected to work with the Guard and its units.

To obtain a current status of education on the National Guard within the Army, a survey (Appendix A) was given to the Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard members of the United States Army War College Class of 1992. One hundred

forty-two officers (71 percent) responded. The students and their opinions represent the thoughts and perceptions of the officers who will lead the Army into the 21st Century.

The statistical make-up of the respondents is as follows:

- A. 89.4 percent Active Army
- B. 4.9 percent Army Reserve
- C. 5.6 percent Army National Guard
- D. 57 percent Combat Arms
- E. 43 percent Combat Support, Combat Service Support and other branches
- F. Averaged 21 years' service
- G. 28.9 percent Lieutenant Colonel
- H. 52.8 percent Lieutenant Colonel Promotable
- I. 18.3 percent Colonel.

Of the class, only 4, or 2.8 percent, had been assigned as an advisor or member of a Readiness Group. This statistic is important for two reasons: first, it demonstrates that very few Active Component officers who are destined for the more important assignments in the Army will have worked with the National Guard in the first twenty years of their career; secondly, by not assigning the top officers as advisors to Guard units or to Readiness Groups, the Army bypasses a valuable educational process. Officers who work with the Guard as advisors or with Readiness Groups will acquire a greater knowledge of the Guard and its capabilities which can be shared with the Active Component in subsequent assignments. This point will be explored in greater detail later in this study.

Other factors effecting an officer's knowledge of the Guard are whether they have had the opportunity to evaluate Guard units or work with one as a result of a Capstone affiliation. Sixty-two percent of the class had evaluated a National Guard unit during its annual training period. Thirty-eight percent had served with an Active Component unit that had a roundout Guard unit. The proposed draw-down of the Army could lead to an increase in these percentages in future years, especially if the Guard is not reduced to the levels anticipated by the DOD leadership.

It is important to note that 32 percent of those surveyed had not conducted any evaluations of Guard units, and 56 percent had not served with units that had a roundout affiliation. Additionally, when questioned if they had worked with the Guard during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT, or at the National Training Center, almost 20 percent indicated they had not.

When questioned as to formal education or instruction on the National Guard in an Army Service School, 36.6 percent responded they had never received any. Fifty percent stated they had received some instruction on the ARNG in CGSC.

An important element of the survey was to determine the knowledge an Active Component officer possesses about the ARNG. Thirty-eight percent felt it was barely adequate, while 22.7 percent responded that it was not adequate. This equates to almost 60 percent admitting they have little or no knowledge on a major portion of the total Army. Wrong perceptions can start

when someone does not know or understand the components they are working with or depending on.

In an interview, the Director for the Center of Army Leadership stated the Active Army officer population, as a whole, did not possess adequate knowledge of the Guard. He further stated that he felt the DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM experience had led to a better, mutual understanding. He did, however, feel this understanding has been forced on the Active Component.²⁴

Seventy percent of the respondents felt that Guard officers have a better knowledge of the Regular Army than the Regular Army officers have of the Guard. This reflects that Active officers realize they don't know enough about the ARNG. This lack of knowledge can create problems when attempting to improve component relations. ARNG officers have a greater knowledge of the Active Army since they are trained in the Active Army school system and probably have served some time on Active duty.

Over 64 percent of the survey respondents felt that education on the ARNG would be useful in improving AC and ARNG relationships. The respondents felt that these courses would be most important in the advanced courses, CGSC and AWC. These courses came at key stages in the officer's career and at times when the officer stands a greater chance to work with ARNG units.

Numerous questions in the survey were used to examine basic knowledge of the Guard. Those questions were answered incorrectly on an average of 20 percent of the time, and with

another 20 percent stating they did not know the answer. While these answers, in themselves, are not critical to one's professional development, they do serve to point out again that a large portion of the total Army is virtually unknown by the Active Component.

Questions about values and relationships between the Guard and Active Army drew very mixed responses. Only 11 percent of the Active Army officers felt that senior National Guard commanders were always treated as equals by their Active counterparts, while 23 percent felt they were seldom treated as equals. The responses here can also be tied in with education and experience with the Guard. It is interesting to note that of the fifteen Reserve Component officers, only one felt senior Guard commanders were treated as equals, while 46 percent believed they were seldom treated as equals.

An extremely important and interesting conclusion was reached when Active Component responses and Reserve responses to the question if Active officers treated their National Guard counterparts as equals were compared. Forty-eight percent of the Active officers felt Guard officers were always or frequently treated as equals. No Guard officer felt that it was always the case, while only 6 percent felt it was frequently so. On the negative extreme, over 15 percent of the Active respondents stated they felt Guard officers were seldom or never treated as equals. Thirty percent of the Reserve Component officers agreed.

This is extremely important and must be improved if the Army is to meet the CSA goal of better understanding. Granted, these may be perceptions and might not be based upon actual experience; they still must be dealt with and improved. Active and Guard officers must learn to trust and treat each other as equals.

The question on the value of Guard units to Active Component headquarters drew similar responses. Over 78 percent of the Active and 40 percent of the Reserve Component officers felt that Army unit headquarters either highly valued or somewhat valued their Guard units. Over 50 percent of the Reserve officers responded that Guard units were either treated indifferently or considered of little value. Only 16 percent of the Active officers shared a similar viewpoint.

This is another serious impediment to attaining the CSA desired goal of improved understanding. Obviously, an Active Component headquarters must place greater emphasis on its subordinate units, but something must be done to insure that Reserve and Guard Capstone units are true members of the team. Since Active officers felt that Guard units were valued more highly than the Guard or Reserve officers thought they were, then another perception problem exists. If the Active Component really values their Reserve Component units, then apparently it is not doing a good job of convincing the Reserve Component. This is a problem that education, in itself, may not solve.

The question if Capstone headquarters strives to make their ARNG Capstone units an important part of their command drew

similar responses. Fifty-two percent of the RC officers felt that the AC headquarters did not make an attempt to make their ARNG units an important part of their command. If they are truly part of the team, then the ARNG units must feel they are important to their capstone headquarters, and apparently this is not happening.

The recent experience in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM may have contributed to the extreme difference between Active and Reserve answers in the two questions concerning capstone relationships. This has been a major issue within the National Guard. The failure to call up National Guard roundout units early in DESERT STORM has been questioned by many in the Guard. Once the call-up was made, these units were subjected to a great deal of repetitious training that many units had just undergone. This issue has been addressed by many Guard leaders and will be subjected to much further discussion in the future.²⁵

All respondents tended to agree on the importance of knowledge on the National Guard. Over 90 percent felt the more knowledge Army leaders have about the National Guard, the better their coordination with the Guard. This may appear to be an overly obvious answer, yet when weighed against previous survey responses concerning training received on the Guard and experience with the Guard, it seems this may have been overlooked. If knowledge is important, then something must be done to improve education of Army officers concerning the Guard.

How senior Army leaders value the National Guard was also linked to knowledge of the Guard by those taking the survey.

Seventy percent of those surveyed felt the more knowledge Active Army leaders have about the National Guard, the more they value the Guard. Once a leader realizes the strengths and capabilities of a unit or an organization, the more that leader will use, or at least consider the use of, that organization.

Seventy-six percent agreed or strongly agreed that Active Army personnel have to be more involved with the Army National Guard. When broken down by component, 100 percent of the Reserve Component officers felt this was important, 74 percent of the Active officers agreed. This demonstrates that while ARNG officers may differ from their Active brethren on how much the Active Component values the ARNG, they strongly want more interaction between the components.

When surveyed on perceptions as to the dedication and abilities of the ARNG, most responses were positive. When asked if the National Guard was a haven for retirement pay seekers or a social club, 58 percent disagreed, 26 percent were neutral, while only 15 percent agreed. This indicates that while experience and education may be lacking, most officers have positive feelings toward members of the Guard. In a similar question, over 88 percent felt that National Guardsmen would report for duty if mobilized. This further reinforces the point that most Active officers feel positive about Guardsmen.

Problems in acceptance of the ARNG or in truly understanding the role of the National Guard became readily apparent when examining survey results that addressed ARNG units and their capabilities. The answers received to several

questions indicate a serious lack of knowledge about the ARNG and its mission.

When asked if rapid mobilization of the Army National Guard Roundout brigades was impossible, 47 percent agreed, 22 percent were neutral, with 30 percent disagreeing. In my opinion, their response could be attributed to the recent negative publicity surrounding the call-up of the Roundup brigades during DESERT STORM, but also indicates a lack of understanding as to how Guard units are mobilized and deployed.

The question if legal constraints would delay rapid mobilization of the ARNG had 29 percent agreeing with, 45 percent disagreeing, and 25 percent neutral. The majority felt that legal constraints would not interfere with mobilization. Even though this is a positive response and legal issues are not a detriment to mobilization, there apparently needs to be some education in this area.

Only 47 percent felt that National Guard units are structured to be rapidly integrated into the Active Army during a war or national crisis. Twenty-seven percent disagreed and 25 percent were neutral. With the draw-down in force structure, it is imperative that we reach a level of trust that insures that Army units accept the ARNG units upon mobilization, and trust these units enough to feel confident they will do their job and do it well.

It is interesting to note, that while survey respondents questioned the ability of individual Guardsmen and ARNG units to perform upon mobilization, over 56 percent felt that some

missions traditionally performed by the Active Army could be shifted to the Army National Guard with little or no loss of capability. While feeling that some missions could be picked up by the ARNG, only 16 percent felt the ARNG should be at the same level of readiness and be able to deploy as quickly as Active forces. The vast majority, 78 percent, disagreed.

The final question dealt with Active Component perceptions of the National Guard. More specifically, when compared to the Active Army, how much influence does the National Guard have with the United States Congress. Seventy percent stated that the ARNG had much more influence with Congress, while 21 percent said a little more than the Active Army. The National Guard, by its constitutional nature, is more political than the Active Army. Since the Guard exists within each state, it must deal with both national and state problems. Additionally, because ARNG units are located within specific districts of states, they represent a large, solid voting block that elected officials listen to.

This survey brings to light the many perceptions that ARNG and Active Component officers may hold about each other. Many of the responses previously discussed were not based upon actual experience, but rather the perceptions held by the respondents. Three other perceptions that an analysis of survey responses reveal are:

- ▶ Active Component may feel that duty with RC units is not beneficial to their careers. This is evident in the extremely low number of officers in the War College

who have served as advisors or in Readiness Groups. If duty with the RC was important in an officer's career development, then more AWC students would have had RC assignments prior to this stage of their career. In my opinion, it is felt to be a career threatening or terminal assignment.

- ▶ AC officers are not confident about the quality or level of training of National Guard units and individuals.
- ▶ National Guard and AC officers feel that Active Army personnel have not had enough involvement with or education on the Guard.

Hopefully, the survey emphasized the apparent lack of knowledge within the Active Army Officer Corps about the National Guard. In the past, the Army has not been concerned with this.

As evidenced by the survey, few Active officers who are selected for the Army War College have served as advisors to Guard units. This practice prevents these quality officers from getting to know the Guard firsthand. Instead, the officer's experience and perceptions on the Guard may come from evaluating a Guard unit during a single annual training period. The problem with relying on evaluating a Guard unit as the basis for understanding the National Guard is that it is simply a snapshot of that unit for that specific period of time and does not reflect the true total picture of the unit. It does not allow

the Active officer to understand the unique characteristics or problems that exist in the Reserve Component environment.

Lastly, the survey demonstrates a need to improve the education of the Active Component on the National Guard. Relationships improve with understanding, and this comes from knowledge.

To meet General Sullivan's goal of understanding and trust within the Total Army, steps must be taken to insure the Officer Corps has a solid starting point from which to achieve that trust and understanding. The one common denominator required to achieve this goal rests in the Army school system.

WHAT CAN BE DONE

The Reserve Component Leader Development Action Plan (RC-LDAP) was a result of the work of the Leader Development Decision Network. Its mission was to develop, coordinate, and publish a single-source action plan for RC leader development comparable to what was available in the AC.²⁶

While the focus of this study was directed at improving the overall leadership training for RC officers, it was interesting to note that one important recommendation made by this study concerned the Active Component. It stated that RC leadership environment needs to be clearly articulated.

1. Objective: Educate legislative and executive branches of the government, Army civilian and military leadership, Active Component officers and NCOs, civilian employees, and the families of the Reserve Component leaders.

2. Discussion: The many dimensions of the RC soldier's life must be clearly understood to determine a realistic assessment of RC expectations. The RC soldier has many high personal priorities including a career and civilian job, (civilian education), and the responsibilities for a family. On top of this are added the demands of a military career.⁷

The demands placed upon the RC soldier are many and varied. While the Active Component soldier also works in a demanding environment, the RC soldier has a unique environment that must be understood. Failure to fully appreciate or understand the nature of the challenges can lead to many false perceptions about the RC, and particularly the National Guard.

The Army must fully understand that the vast majority of Guard leaders are also leaders in their civilian jobs, churches, and communities. The pressures these individuals encounter in their day-to-day activities are only compounded when they face the exacting demands of their military position.

Army Field Manual (FM) 25-100 points out these challenges and states these differences and challenges must be recognized by Army senior leaders.²⁸ FM 25-100 also addresses the limited training time available to Guard and Reserve units and states that even with these hindrances, the development process for a unit's Mission Essential Task list is the same as it is for Active Component organization.²⁹

FM 25-100 states that the RC environment must be understood by Army leaders. It further states that the same training development processes are to be used by AC and Guard, yet only 17 percent of the Active Army officers surveyed were aware of this.

The failure to fully train its Active officers on the National Guard is evident. Even though the Army has recognized the importance of the Guard to the total force, very little has been done to insure that it is understood.

The Army's Leader Development Program is built on three important parts; schooling, assignments, and self-development. The lack of instruction in the school system indicates that the Army expects the AC officer to obtain knowledge on the Guard through assignments. Perhaps the real truth is that there is no thought given to whether education on the Guard is important at all.

The Army school system is designed to provide formal education and training so officers can better develop their job-related and leadership skills. The schools are designed to assist the officer's professional growth as he or she progresses through their career.

While schools provide the officer with the basic knowledge needed for job-related skills, the officer builds upon this with actual experience in assignments. The officer is expected to take what has been taught in the various schools and apply that in actual assignments. This application of hands-on experience, coupled with the various challenges of leadership, serves to broaden the knowledge of the officer. Finally, an officer may elect to participate in a self-development or self-improvement program. This can consist of enrollment in Army correspondence programs, attending civilian schools, or simply a self-taught program of reading professional and historical literature.

The road to better understanding and a true "Total Army" needs to start with education on the National Guard. This is an important step and, yet, will be difficult to take.

LTC Jack Burwell, Officer Training Branch Chief, Leader Development Division, TRADOC, stated that although the training of AC officers on the National Guard might be important, the "plate is full" at every officer school.³⁰ The Basic Officer Training Course length is based upon the length needed to teach the basic branch-required knowledge. Average length at present is sixteen weeks.³¹

Officer Advanced Courses are twenty weeks in length. Several Advanced Courses have specialized follow-on programs on weapon packages. As in the Basic Course, there is no room for additional instruction without chopping something that is presently being taught.³²

As previously noted, there is no Guard instruction currently in the Basic or Advanced Courses, and only a minimum in CAS³, CGSC, and AWC. Instruction on the Guard should be added in the common core subjects in the Basic and Advanced Courses. This could be in areas such as UCMJ and logistics. Additional instruction in CAS³, CGSC, and Army War College curriculum could be added as appropriate to areas in which the topic would logically appear.

What must be addressed, if instruction on the Guard is added, is what topics will be covered. The elective course taught at the Command and General Staff College provides a basic idea of what should be taught on the Guard, although the intent

of that course, as is the elective on the Reserve Components in the Army College, is to prepare officers for duty with the Reserves.³³

The course lists three primary tasks. These tasks provide the basics that should be presented in any course of instruction on the Guard. These tasks are:³⁴

TASK: Fundamentals of Guard missions, organizations, logistics, mobilization and training.

TASK: Interaction between National Guard and Active Component units and assisting units such as readiness groups.

TASK: Instruction on roles of U.S. Forces Command, National Guard Bureau, Unit Advisors, CAPSTONE, Roundup, Roundout.

Other topics for inclusion in instruction at all levels should include, but not be limited to:

- A. Problems of geographic dispersion
- B. Relationships between traditional Guardsmen, AGRs, and the Technician work force
- C. Guard command relationships
- D. The role of the State Adjutant General and his staff
- E. The relationship of the Adjutant General and the Governor
- F. State missions
- G. Challenges that civilian jobs and competing needs present
- H. Mobilization
- I. FORMDEPS

J. Directed training associations

The battalion pre-command course should place special emphasis on Guard-related instruction. If the previous topics were taught and refreshed at the various schools, the focus here could be placed on supporting and evaluating National Guard units. The various aspects of capstone relationships must be addressed at this time. This is critical since most combat arms battalions will find themselves working with and evaluating National Guard units.

A building block approach could be used to fix the education system. The officers would receive their introduction during MQS 1 in ROTC, OCS, or at the U.S. Military Academy, with further reinforcement during the Officer Basic Course.

Following the Basic Course, the officer's next contact with Guard instruction would be in the Advanced Course. This instruction would cover material similar to the Basic Course except in more detail in selected areas. The time requirements would be one hour in the Basic Course and two hours in the Advanced Course. Both courses would have supporting reading requirements.

CAS³ should retain its mobilization instruction. Topics previously recommended should be added, with increased emphasis upon Army-Guard relationships and evaluating Guard units during annual training periods.

An interview was conducted with an Active Army resident CGSC student who had a previous assignment with a Readiness

Group. The officer was uniquely qualified to discuss both CAS³ and CGSC since he was a member of a Readiness Group when he attended CAS³. He felt that more instruction on the Guard was definitely needed.³⁵

He felt that emphasis should be placed upon the real world force structure mix, with a close look at Corps structure after mobilization. Pointers on how to effectively and smoothly bring Guard units into the Active force should be covered. Similarities and differences should also be illustrated.³⁶ While these represent one officer's ideas, the author feels that they offer much for consideration. His recommendations are valid for both CAS³ and CGSC.

Command and General Staff College must focus a great deal of attention on the Guard. From this point in an officer's career, they will probably be involved with Guard units in some capacity. Although not all Active officers will work directly with the ARNG, as they are assigned to positions of more responsibility, they will tend to impact the ARNG.

The final step would be the instruction presented in the Army War College. If the officer receives instruction on the Guard in each of the previous Army schools, then if selected for the Army War College, he arrives with a solid background on the ARNG. Instruction at the War College should focus more on where the ARNG fits into meeting the various threats to national security. ARNG-related instruction at this level would help prepare the officer to better serve on Army and Joint Staffs

since there would be a better working knowledge of the "Total Army."

The all important first step must be made in the area of education in the Army schools. Granted, time is a premium in every school; but some time must be found for the Guard.

W. Edwards Deming, the man who is credited with revitalizing Japanese industry, has done much to contribute new thinking to management. He is an advocate of education, knowledge, and effort. He promotes the ideas of quality and service. His ideas were originally designed to improve management and manufacturing; however, they can be applied to other areas as well.³⁷

Dr. Deming established the Fourteen Points which may be used to help attain improvement. After reviewing the fourteen points in regard to application toward improvement in education of the Officer Corps, it was easy to recognize how applicable they are.

Point Thirteen is very pertinent to this study. It calls for instituting a vigorous program of education and retraining. The point states that it is not merely good enough to have good people. In an organization, people must continually acquire new knowledge and training.³⁸ Education and retraining are important to any long-term planning and, in our case, toward changing attitudes of the Army toward the Guard.

Dr. Deming says:

How do you help people to improve? What do you mean by improve? If you ask me, I would say that I find a general fear of education. People are afraid to take a chance. It

might not be the right one. My advice is to take it. Find the right one later. And how do you know it is the wrong one? Study, learn, improve."

Just as Dr. Deming says, we must be educated and retrained. It is time the Army schools took steps to retrain its present Officer Corps on the National Guard. The Army must prepare appropriate courses for the next generation of leaders. If the Army fails to take this step, it will not have gone the extra step toward improving understanding and insuring that there is one true Total Army.

OTHER MEANS OF EDUCATION

The primary focus of this study is the Army school system. Yet, two other means of education of the officer must be briefly addressed if there is to be improvement.

The survey conducted pointed out that only four officers of the 1992 Army War College Class had served either as National Guard advisors or with Readiness Groups. If the Army would make service with the ARNG or Reserve a key step in an officer's career, then officers would seek these assignments earlier. Following these assignments, officers would return to Active Component units and further educate other officers on the capabilities of the ARNG. Unfortunately, assignments with the National Guard are currently considered career terminating.

One state's experience with Army advisors is easily seen in New Mexico. Of the last three Senior Army Advisors, a Colonel's position, one was reassigned at the request of the Adjutant General, and the last two retired. The last Captain to be

assigned in the Senior Advisor's Office was passed over for promotion and released from active duty. The last two brigade advisors, Lieutenant Colonels, both retired from active duty.⁴⁰

The importance of this is not to question the professionalism of the officers concerned, but to demonstrate that, all too often, assignment to the Guard as an advisor is often perceived as an opportunity to select an area in which to retire as opposed to being a critical assignment in an officer's career. Obviously, some advisors will retire from their positions, but this should be the exception, not the rule. These officers should go on to other assignments and further educate the Army on the ARNG.

The FY 91 Defense Authorization Bill called for active duty officers and NCOs to be assigned to active Guard Reserve slots.⁴¹ This was further supported in the legislation by an expressed desire in Congress for all officers in both the Army and Air Force to serve a two-year assignment with the Guard or Reserve as a condition for their promotion to Colonel O-6.⁴²

While the Authorization Bill is an important step, it is presently caught up in an implementation problem. Congress originally called for Army personnel to hold Table of Organization and Equipment positions. The National Guard welcomes the officers and NCOs as advisors, but not as members of the unit.⁴³

Whatever the outcome, this is an important step. These personnel can carry their experiences with them to their next assignments. Hopefully, the political ramifications will be

solved to both the Army's and National Guard's satisfaction and these individuals can perform their duties.

From 1980 to 1986, another program existed that was useful in educating the Army about the ARNG, and at the same time provided valuable experience to National Guard officers by providing them an opportunity to serve in Active Army units. This was the Captains to Europe program. This program was initiated at the Army's request to fill a shortage of Captains serving in Europe. Under the program, ARNG officers could volunteer to serve thirty months on active duty in Europe. In 1983, at its highest point, there were 165 officers in the program.⁴⁴

Upon their release from active duty, these officers returned to their state units. Not only were they given the opportunity to educate the Army on the ARNG, but they also received valuable hands-on experiences they carried back to their units.

This program is no longer in existence, yet should be considered as a program valuable to both the Army and the ARNG. The turbulent times of the nineties may keep this mutually beneficial training program from occurring; it should, however, not be forgotten.

Another valuable means of educating the Active Army is with the National Guard's Key Personnel Upgrade Program (KPUP). This is a unique program that allows Army National Guard personnel to train individually with their Active Army counterparts all over the world. Program participants are provided an opportunity to

improve their duty skills while serving with an Active Army unit. This program gives the ARNG soldier a chance to receive additional training, either alongside or in place of an Active Army soldier. It also enhances individual mission proficiency, promotes confidence, and helps increase the leadership ability of the Guard soldiers.⁴⁵

While this program, in all probability, does more for the Guard than the Army, it is still an important tool to use in education. The Active Army officers, NCOs, and soldiers all receive experience concerning the Guard by having Guardsmen serve with them in their units.

Naturally, every opportunity to meet, evaluate, or even train with Guardsmen and Guard units will go a long way toward educating Active Component soldiers on the National Guard. Every available opportunity must be taken advantage of by the Army leadership to insure that Army officers can learn about the Guard through experience. The examples of experiences with the Guard mentioned in this section are not all inclusive, but should serve to stimulate the serious study of how best to provide these opportunities.

An important step in education of an officer is through his own efforts at self-improvement. This is accomplished through a self-initiated participation in some form of formal education or through correspondence courses.

The easiest way to assist Active officers in self-improvement is to create a separate correspondence course on the Army National Guard. This course should be detailed and cover

topics that are recommended for inclusion in the Army school's resident programs.

These courses should be made available to those officers who have already met most of their Army school requirements. It would serve as a refresher to those officers who had received schoolhouse training on the Guard.

While this study has focused on Army schools and how to better educate Army officers, the author would be remiss not to mention the Non Commissioned Officer (NCO). The NCO is one of the greatest teachers an officer has in their career. NCOs can easily influence the young Lieutenant and their opinions carry great weight even with General Officers. Therefore, the NCO Corps of the Army must also be provided opportunities to learn about the National Guard.

CONCLUSION

Since 1900 there have been seven major mobilizations of the National Guard, with the last being the call-up for DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The other six were:

1916	Mexican Border War	156,644 Guardsmen
1917	World War I	379,071 Guardsmen
1941	World War II	300,034 Guardsmen
1950	Korean War	183,600 Guardsmen
1961	Berlin Crisis	50,739 Guardsmen
1968	Vietnam War	12,234 Guardsmen

TOTAL	1,082,342 ⁴⁶
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The National Guard has proven itself time and again in the history of the United States. It has proven to be an effective

organization and one that provides trained units and manpower at a fraction of the cost of the Active Army. Regardless of the final force mix, the Guard will be expected to contribute a large portion of the combat forces available for our nation's defense.

The fast-paced environment of the modern world means that our total Army must be ready to respond to any emergency. In order to be prepared to meet any eventuality, the three components must rely on and trust each other.

It is important to note that there has been a traditional distrust of the professional military in this country.⁴⁷ Perhaps this distrust is due to the colonial experience with the British soldiers prior to and during the American Revolution. There is a longstanding tradition of service for the citizen soldier. Simply looking at the number of Army National Guardsmen mobilized in this century points this out. As Colonel Harry Summers has said:

It was the "citizen soldier"--the National Guard and the Army Reserve--not the regulars who fought America's wars and who was the traditional "savior" of his country.⁴⁸

Many commentators and writers have attributed the great national outpouring of support for the recent conflict in DESERT STORM to the Presidential call-up of ARNG units. The official after-action report of the National Guard states that community leaders, school children, and the general public turned out to bid their own troops farewell. The support given to the Army National Guard by their communities greatly enhanced the overall public support for both DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.⁴⁹

The components of the Army--the Active, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve--must know, understand, and trust each other. The means to initiating this understanding is through education. Once we have reached the level of understanding, as called for by General Sullivan, then there truly will be a "Total Army."

APPENDIX A

RESERVE COMPONENT ORGANIZATION AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT

I. Background Information

1. What is your component:

89.4 Regular Army
4.9 U.S. Army Reserves
5.6 Army National Guard
0 Other

2. What is your primary branch:

57.0 Combat Arms
16.9 Combat Support
21.1 Combat Service Support
3.5 Health Services
1.4 Other

3. Source of Commission:

14.8 USMA
59.9 ROTC
15.5 OCS
2.8 State Academy OCS
7.0 Other

4. Years of Service: 21 mean

5. What is your current rank?

28.9 LTC
52.8 LTC (P)
18.3 COL

6. Have you ever been assigned to the Army National Guard either as an advisor or as a member of a Readiness Group?

2.8 Yes
88.7 No
8.5 I am in the National Guard/Reserves

7. Have you ever been assigned to evaluate a National Guard unit during its annual training period?
- 62.0 Yes
32.4 No
5.6 I am in the National Guard/Reserves
8. Have you ever served in a Regular Army unit that had a National Guard Roundout or Roundup unit?
- 38.7 Yes
55.6 No
5.6 I am in the National Guard/Reserves
9. Were you ever a member of a National Guard or Army Reserve Unit prior to coming on active duty as a Regular Army officer?
- 5.6 Yes
85.2 No
9.2 I am in the National Guard/Reserves
10. Did you work with Army National Guard units during:
(Check all that apply)
- 4.9 Just Cause
29.6 Desert Shield
32.4 Desert Storm
4.2 Provide Comfort
11.3 National Training Center
46.5 Other
19.7 Never worked with the Army National Guard

II. Information About the National Guard

11. Have you ever received formal instruction on the National Guard in any Army school?
- 36.6 A. NO formal instruction
63.4 B. YES, check all that apply
- 16.9 Basic Officer
23.2 Advanced Officer
2.8 CAS³
53.5 CGSC

12. Do you feel that Senior Active Component Officers possess adequate knowledge of the National Guard?
- 2.8 More than adequate
 - 36.2 Adequate
 - 38.3 Barely adequate
 - 22.7 Not adequate
13. In your opinion, when Senior Army Advisors are assigned to National Guard units, they have:
- 0 A lot of knowledge of the Guard upon initial assignment
 - 51.4 Some knowledge of the Guard upon assignment
 - 41.3 A little knowledge of the Guard upon assignment
 - 7.2 No knowledge of the Guard upon assignment
14. Do you feel that National Guard (NG) officers have better knowledge of the Regular Army than Regular Army (RA) officers have of the National Guard?
- 24.6 A. NG much better knowledge of RA
 - 44.4 B. NG somewhat better knowledge of RA
 - 28.9 C. About the same
 - 2.1 D. RA somewhat better knowledge of NG
 - 0 E. RA much less knowledge of NG
15. At what school(s) do you feel an education program on the roles and missions of the National Guard would be of most benefit to Active Army officers?
- 31.0 Basic
 - 68.3 Advanced Course
 - 35.2 CAS³
 - 81.0 CGSC
 - 49.3 AWC
 - 12.0 Other
16. Do you feel a meaningful/effective training program for Active Army officers on the National Guard in Officer Basic Courses, Officers Advanced Courses, and Command and General Staff College would improve the relationship between the Army and the Guard?
- 64.1 Yes
 - 17.6 No
 - 18.3 Don't know

17. To your knowledge, with what funds are Army National Guard Personnel paid for weekend drills?

- 20.7 State funds
- 60.0 Federal funds
- 17.1 Don't know
- 2.1 Both

18. The State Area Command (STARC) is the headquarters of the Adjutant General and his staff. As such, the STARC:
(Check all applicable)

- 41.8 A. Commands all units in the state
- 49.6 B. Is a resource headquarters
- 46.1 C. Is responsible for mobilization
- 53.9 D. Provides staff for State Adjutant General
- 19.1 E. Is a state-only function with no federal activities or connections

19. Are commissioning and promotion requirements for Army National Guard officers the same as for Active Army officers?

- 19.1 Yes
- 66.0 No
- 14.9 Don't know

20. To what extent are senior National Guard commanders treated as equals by their Active duty counterparts?

- 11.5 Always
- 30.2 Frequently
- 32.4 Sometimes
- 23.0 Seldom
- 2.9 Never

21. To what extent do you feel Army National Guard units may be relied upon in combat?

- 18.0 A. Always
- 41.0 B. Frequently
- 36.0 C. Sometimes
- 5.0 D. Seldom
- 0 E. Never

22. To what extent do National Guard units use the same criteria as Active Component Units when developing Mission Essential Task Lists?
- 17.9 A. Always
 - 44.8 B. Frequently
 - 25.4 C. Sometimes
 - 10.4 D. Seldom
 - 1.5 E. Never
23. To what extent are Guard units graded to the same criteria when taking ARTEPS as Active units?
- 11.9 A. Always
 - 21.6 B. Frequently
 - 33.6 C. Sometimes
 - 28.4 D. Seldom
 - 4.5 E. Never
24. National Guard Officers and NCO personnel subject to the same time in grade, time in service and educational requirements for promotion as Active Component personnel.
- 16.4 True
 - 59.3 False
 - 24.3 Don't know
25. National Guard Bureau formulates and administers programs to insure the continued development and maintenance of Army Guard units.
- 70.5 True
 - 6.5 False
 - 23.0 Don't know
26. National Guard Bureau serves as the channel of communications between the states and the Department of the Army.
- 85.0 True
 - 2.9 False
 - 12.1 Don't know
27. Regular Army personnel are assigned to serve on the National Guard Bureau staff.
- 64.0 True
 - 12.2 False
 - 23.7 Don't know

28. Commanders of 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th Armies command the National Guard units within their Army area.

11.4 True
71.4 False
17.1 Don't know

29. To what extent do you feel Active Army officers treat their National Guard officer counterparts as equals?

6.6 Always
35.0 Frequently
40.1 Sometimes
16.1 Seldom
2.2 Never

30. Based upon your knowledge or opinion, do you feel that Active Army headquarters:

20.1 Highly value their Guard units
58.3 Somewhat value their Guard units
11.5 Are indifferent to their Guard units
10.1 Place little value on their Guard units
0 Do not value their Guard units

III. Leadership and Training Experiences

31. In all Army components, how long were you in command of:

Platoon 1.8 years
Company 2.3 years
Battalion 2.1 years
Brigade 2.3 years

QUESTIONS 32 THROUGH 40 DID NOT APPLY TO THIS STUDY

IV. The following section consists of attitudes about the National Guard and its relationship with the Regular Army. Please circle the number that best describes your attitude.

41. All too often the National Guard has tended to be a "Social Club" or a haven for retirement pay seekers, draft dodgers, and the like.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
13.5	44.7	26.2	14.9	.7

42. National Guardsmen are, for the most part, adequately trained to make a positive contribution from the first day of their activation.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
7.8	38.3	17.0	34.0	2.8

43. Some missions traditionally reposed in the Active Army can be shifted to the Army National Guard with little or no loss of capability.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
5.7	23.4	14.9	45.4	10.6

44. The Army National Guard should be at the same level of readiness and be able to deploy as quickly as the Active forces.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
18.0	60.4	5.0	15.8	.7

45. Rapid mobilization of the Army National Guard roundout brigades has proven to be impossible.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
5.7	24.8	22.0	35.5	12.1

46. I am confident most (90%) of the National Guardsmen will report for duty in response to a mobilization order.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
1.4	5.0	5.7	56.0	31.9

47. Legal constraints will probably delay the rapid mobilization of the Army National Guard.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
5.7	39.3	25.7	27.9	1.4

48. National Guard units are structured to be rapidly integrated into the Active Army during a war or national crisis.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
2.1	25.5	25.5	42.6	4.3

49. Political constraints will probably delay the rapid mobilization of Army National Guard units.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
2.9	25.0	19.3	42.9	10.0

50. The Regular Army Capstone/Roundout Headquarters strive to make their National Guard Capstone/Roundout units an important part of their command.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
2.1	17.7	27.7	48.2	4.3

51. The more knowledge Army leaders have about the National Guard, the better their coordination with the Guard.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
0	4.3	3.6	65.0	27.1

52. The more knowledge Army leaders have about the National Guard, the more they value the Guard.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
0	9.9	19.1	56.0	14.9

53. National Guard Bureau has an adequate voice in force structure development.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
1.4	15.2	46.4	28.3	8.7

54. Active Army personnel have to be more involved with the Army National Guard.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
1.4	7.1	15.0	52.1	24.3

55. The greatly increased warning time of conventional conflict in Europe increasingly allows the heavy armor mission to be shifted to the Army National Guard.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
24.3	42.1	12.9	17.1	3.6

56. As compared with the Active Army, how much influence does the National Guard exert with the United States Congress?

70.9	<u>Much more</u> than Active Army
21.3	A little <u>more</u> than Active Army
5.0	About <u>the same</u> as Active Army
2.8	A little <u>less</u> than Active Army
0	<u>Much less</u> than Active Army

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